This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes into account both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration.
Introduction
Traditional analysis of takeover or merger incentives in oligopolistic industries has mainly focused on conditions of stability. Essentially, this analysis asks whether insiders would be better o¤ by staying independent instead of merging their business. This criterion is most explicit in axiomatic approaches on endogenous cartel formation (see, e.g., Selten (1973) ) and ownership structures (see, e.g., Horn and Persson (2001) ), and it is used in the seminal work of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) and Davidson and Deneckere (1985) on exogenously proposed mergers. But it also drives the analysis of pure strategy equilibria in the simultaneous auction model of Kamien and Zang (1990) .
A crucial implication of the standard approach is that the outsiders' share of total industry gains that arise from concentration plays no role for predicting merger incentives. Besides neglecting potentially relevant information, which may prove useful for empirical studies, the stability approach yields rather extreme predictions. Most notably, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) …nd that in the linear Cournot model with homogeneous products only a bilateral merger to monopoly is stable, while Davidson and Deneckere (1985) show for the linear Bertrand model with di¤erentiated products that any bilateral merger is stable. 1 At the same time, however, outsiders gain more than insiders in both models. To our knowledge, the resulting free-rider problem due to the public good character of increasing industry concentration has not yet been fully incorporated in theoretical approaches dealing with merger incentives. 2 Casual observations reveal that the public good nature of increased concentration and its implications for takeover strategies are not too far fetched. A recent example is provided by the depressed semiconductor industry, where rumors of (further) consolidation among chipmakers tend to boost share prices of all market participants.
3 Illustrative are also reactions to the recent announcement of Japan's Nippon Steel that it intends to tie-up its business with those of Sumitomo Metal Industries and Kobe Steel. Together with hopes of further mergers in the US this considerably boosted share prices for European steel makers. Interestingly, the head of the newly formed European steel maker Arcelor called for further mergers within the steel industry when commenting on the intentions to consolidate the Japanese steel industry. 4;5 To capture the free-rider problem and thereby incorporate both insiders' and outsiders' pro…ts into the takeover prediction, we propose to model the takeover process as an auction in which a designated target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions on …rms' characteristics we obtain a simple and intuitive prediction for the probability of takeover. This probability is only a function of the number of market participants and of the insiders' share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Typically, the takeover probability is less than one as, given the target's optimal reserve price, being an outsider will be more pro…table than becoming an insider. Our major application is to provide a complete characterization of takeover incentives in the N -…rm linear Cournot and Bertrand case.
More precisely, our analysis proceeds in two steps. Section 2 solves the takeover model and discusses the implied predictions. Amongst other things, our bidding game reveals an hitherto unexplored di¤erence between …xed and marginal cost synergies. In contrast to marginal cost synergies, …xed cost synergies of any size never imply that a takeover will be successful with probability one. Consequently, from a welfare perspective it is likely that there are too few takeovers with …xed cost synergies.
Section 3 applies the takeover model to the study of the N-…rm linear Bertrand and Cournot case. We …nd that an increase in concentration is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods are complements. Moreover, we show that the probability of takeover is decreasing in the degree of substitutability between products under Cournot competition and increasing under Bertrand competition. Our analysis for the linear case therefore provides a complete picture how the mode of competition, the character of goods, and the di¤er-entiation of products a¤ect market concentration. Despite the prominence of the linear model in the theoretical literature on industrial organization, such an analysis has, to our knowledge, not been undertaken so far.
Incidentally, in the course of our analysis we also obtain a complete characterization of the stability condition with di¤erentiated substitutes and complements in the linear model, which, to our knowledge, has also not been provided so far.
Finally, by linking the mode of competition and the likelihood of takeover we can complement previous work on the welfare comparison of Bertrand and Cournot competition. This line of research was initiated by Singh and Vives (1984) and Vives (1985) (see also more recently Dastidar (1997) , Qiu (1997), and Häckner (2000) ). We argue that a comparison of total welfare must take into account the possibility of further concentration, which may counteract gains in consumer surplus arising from a more competitive mode of strategic interaction.
We are only aware of two recent papers by Molnar (2000) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2000) that also consider how insiders fare relatively to outsiders. However, both papers focus on unpro…table preemptive mergers and neither of them considers reserve price maximization nor makes the subsequent market interaction in form of Cournot or Bertrand competition explicit. As …rms interact in the market, our model of takeover represents an auction with externalities. From this strand of the literature Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000a,b) are most closely related as they also consider downstream interaction among bidders. In contrast to our paper, these papers focus on the interdependency between allocative and informational externalities and on the optimal design of licence auctions, respectively. 6 2 The General Model
The Bidding Game
Consider an industry with N > 2 …rms, indexed by i 2 I = f1; :::; Ng, which produce symmetrically di¤erentiated products and face the same cost conditions. If the N independent …rms compete in the market, they realize the same pro…t denoted by ¦ N > 0. Let …rm i = 1 be the target …rm, which is exogenously picked.
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Suppose the takeover is successful. This reduces the number of independent …rms to N ¡ 1. If N ¡ 1 …rms compete in the market, the integrated …rm, which controls multiple products, i.e., that of the target and the acquirer, realizes the pro…t ¦ N¡1 M . The N ¡ 2 symmetric outsiders, which control a unitary product, realize
Total industry gains from an increase in concentration are then given by
In the light of the following applications, we can restrict consideration to cases where, following takeover, total industry pro…ts strictly increase. 8 Assumption 1. Industry pro…ts strictly increase after takeover:
6 These authors have also shown in previous work how positive and negative externalities may in ‡u-ence the strategy of bidders (see, for instance, Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996) ). 7 This can be explained, e.g., by retirement or death of the owner of the …rm or unforeseen adverse shocks. In the following we assume that the target …rm remains active in the market if there is no takeover, implying, for instance, that a …nancial investor or a …rm operating in a di¤erent market would step in if intra-industry takeover fails. 8 This condition rules out the case where ¼ M < 0 and ¼ U < 0 holds, for which we …nd multiple symmetric (bidding) equilibria. In these cases there is, however, always an equilibrium where no takeover takes place. If we select this equilibrium, which maximizes industry pro…ts, Proposition 1 also extends to these cases.
Note that this assumption implies, in particular, that either
We now specify the takeover game as an auction where the target can commit to a reserve price. This formulation incorporates two distinctive features of real-world takeovers for corporate control. Predominant takeover regulation in the United States encourages the board of directors to structure the sale of the …rm's assets as an auction, while it is generally believed that the …rm's board has considerable power in extracting rents from bidders. For instance, Cramton (1998) compares the various tactics employed by the target …rm (most importantly the use of poison pills) to setting an (implicit) reserve price. While our proposed takeover game incorporates these features, our focus on the issue of a free-rider problem among competing …rms leads us to abstract from the role of informational incompleteness or institutional details such as toeholds, minority shareholders, or participation costs.
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The takeover process involves two stages. In the …rst stage, the target commits to sell to the highest bidder if the respective price does not fall short of a reserve price B, which is chosen by the target. (We comment below on the outcome if the target can not commit.) In the second stage, buyers simultaneously submit bids. When analyzing the takeover game, we restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria where bidders choose symmetric strategies and where ties are broken randomly. (We comment below on the justi…cation of this requirement.) An outcome of the takeover game consists thus of a reserve price set by the target, the posted bids, and the selected acquirer (if any). Under the symmetry restriction we …nd a unique equilibrium. In what follows we are only interested in the industry's takeover probability, which we denote by ½. We thus restrict the description of the equilibrium to ½. Proposition 1. The takeover game has a unique equilibrium outcome where bidders use symmetric strategies. The takeover probability ½ is given as follows:
Proof. By Assumption 1, we only have to consider the following cases (i)-(iii) stated in the proposition. Assertion (i) is immediate because the merger is unpro…table. We can 9 The public good problem on which we focus is di¤erent from that analyzed in the …nance literature, where the refusal of individual shareholders to tender their shares may frustrate a value enhancing takeover (see Grossman and Hart (1980) ).
thus restrict consideration to the cases (ii) and (iii) where ¼ M > 0. Suppose that the target sets B such that
implying by optimality that any serious bid will just match the reserve price B. As we restrict consideration to symmetric bidding strategies, denote by r the probability with which each …rm i > 1 bids seriously. Given (2) this probability will be determined by an indi¤erence requirement. To determine this indi¤erence condition between posting the bid B and abstaining from putting in a serious bid, it proves to be more convenient to take a slightly di¤erent approach. If a …rm is indi¤erent between these two strategies, it is as well indi¤erent between abstaining from bidding and bidding seriously with probability r. In the …rst case the probability of takeover is just 1 ¡ (1 ¡ r) N ¡2 . The …rm's expected payo¤ from this strategy is then equal to
If the …rm decides to bid with probability r, its expected payo¤ is determined as follows. From an ex-ante perspective, i.e., before the …rm has rolled the dice to determine whether to bid seriously or not, takeover takes now place with probability 1¡ (1¡ r)
. Moreover, the …rm expects to buy the target with probability
Hence, the expected payo¤ from mixing with probability r is equal to
Requiring now that (3) equals (4), we obtain the condition
Condition (5) determines for each B satisfying (2) a unique equilibrium bidding probability and vice versa. Substituting into the target's payo¤, which we denote by -, we obtain
Di¤erentiating with respect to r yields
By (6) -is strictly quasiconcave over 0 · r · 1. We are now in the position to prove the assertion for the cases (ii) and (iii). Consider …rst case (iii), where ¼ M > 0 and
Substituting (7) into the probability of takeover yields (1). It remains to show that (2) must be satis…ed.
implies r = 0 and as r = 1 holds for all
, these choices of B are not optimal for the target. Turn next to case (ii), where ¼ U · 0. This implies by (6) that -is strictly increasing in r and obtains its maximum at the corner r = 1, so that ½ = 1. We can again exclude all choices
Proposition 1 states that the takeover probability is only a function of the number of …rms and the share of total industry gains that is appropriated by the insiders. The takeover probability is equal to zero if only outsiders gain from concentration. It is equal to one only if outsiders will not gain at all. As demonstrated below, this is typically only the case if insiders enjoy synergies by which their marginal costs are reduced. Consider next the intermediate case, in which both insiders and outsiders gain. Regardless of the relative size of ¼ U and ¼ M , we …nd that the target sets the reserve price su¢ciently high such that 0 < ¼ M ¡ B < ¼ U . While all …rms bene…t from a takeover, given this choice of the reserve price any bidder would prefer to stay an outsider rather than to win the auction. In equilibrium each bidder randomizes over bidding the posted reserve price B or abstaining, e.g., by putting in an unacceptable o¤er. By (7) the probability with which each …rm bids seriously is equal to the insiders' share of pro…ts.
In what follows, we investigate how various factors in ‡uence the probability of takeover. By (1) this only amounts to analyzing how the insiders' share of total gains
In particular, we will consider the role of …xed and marginal cost savings in this section, while Section 3 considers the choice of Bertrand or Cournot competition, the substitutability or complementarity of goods, and the role of product di¤erentiation in a linear model.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we comment on some aspects of our bidding game. Consider …rst the restriction to symmetric bidding equilibria. In the most interesting case when both insiders and outsiders bene…t from concentration the bidding game has always multiple asymmetric equilibria where some …rm(s) are made the primary acquirer(s) and the remaining …rms abstain from bidding. In particular, there always exists an equilibrium where some …rm i¸2 takes over the target and pays the price ¦ N¡1 M ¡ ¦ N . By choosing this equilibrium we obtain the extreme prediction that a takeover occurs with probability one and leaves the acquirer with zero gains. In particular, the pro…t di¤erential ¼ U does not a¤ect the outcome. Furthermore, coordination on asymmetric equilibria may be impossible if there are no explicit coordination mechanisms or if players can neither negotiate e¢ciently nor write binding contracts. 11, 12 It may be questioned whether the target can fully commit to a reserve price. In the absence of a reserve price exceeding ¦ N , it generally holds in case (iii) that the probability of takeover is strictly higher than that in (1). In particular, the probability is always equal to one if the gains of insiders do not fall short of those of outsiders. As noted above, the optimal choice of the reserve price by the target creates a public good problem amongst bidders even if insiders gain more than outsiders, while otherwise the already existing public good problem becomes more aggravated. 13, 14 Finally, as argued in the introduction, we feel that the route taken in this paper has the advantage of incorporating more information into the prediction of takeovers and therefore of the prevailing industry concentration. It may now be argued that as long as a takeover bene…ts insiders these gains should be realized, at least in the long run. In this respect our results present a short-run prediction of takeover activity. If the market is, however, constantly re-shaped by exogenous forces, prompting entry and exit, the public good e¤ect underlying Proposition 1 may well have permanent implications for the prevailing degree of concentration.
Cost Synergies
While still con…ning ourselves to a reduced form for …rms' pro…ts, we can use Proposition 1 to investigate how cost synergies a¤ect the takeover probabilities. This reveals a fundamental di¤erence between …xed and marginal cost reductions.
Suppose …rst that the takeover decreases insiders' …xed costs, e.g., by reducing over-1 1 Similar symmetry restrictions are often invoked in the literature on war of attrition games (see for an overview Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ). It might be argued that the target can break the coordination problem by determining a "preferred" bidder. However, unless we introduce a di¤erent game, this communication does not alter the equilibrium set. 1 2 Harsanyi's (1973) puri…cation theorem provides another rationale for con…ning the analysis to symmetric strategies. From this perspective, we may interpret the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information bidding game as the limit of pure-strategy equilibria of slightly perturbed games of incomplete information where, for example, buyers have private information about their (statistically independent) payo¤s in case of takeover. 1 3 Formally, by substituting B = ¦ N , the individual bidding probabilities r are obtained implicitly by equation (5) 
The target may likewise lack the commitment not to sell in the future if the current bids fall short of its reserve price. If this is the case, an extension of our model would allow for repeated auctions, taking place with some delay. Delay may be costly as players discount future payo¤s and as they obtain in the meantime the N -…rm oligopoly pro…ts (per period of time).
head expenditures. To express this in a parsimonious way, assume that integrating their business allows insiders to reap some windfall gain of f¸0. In a slight abuse of notation the pro…t di¤erential of insiders is thus equal to ¼ M + f . As …rms' strategies on the output market are not a¤ected, the pro…t di¤erential of outsiders remains una¤ected. Under standard conditions, which, for instance, prevail in the linear case analyzed in the following section, outsiders are always positively a¤ected by a higher concentration as long as the integrating …rms do not enjoy a reduction in marginal costs. Given ¼ U > 0, we know from (1) that regardless of the size of f the takeover probability will always stay below one. As f becomes high, it is, however, very likely that the takeover increases welfare, even after taking into account a possible reduction in consumer rents.
Hence, if …xed cost synergies are su¢ciently high, it is likely that takeover occurs with an ine¢ciently low probability. In sharp contrast, if the integrated …rm can reduce its marginal costs, this should a¤ect outsiders negatively. Moreover, if this e¤ect is su¢ciently pronounced, outsiders may become strictly worse o¤ compared to the status-quo. But given ¼ U · 0 we know from (1) that the takeover must occur with probability one.
Takeover Incentives under Bertrand and Cournot

Competition
Suppose that a representative consumer's utility from consuming the quantity q i of …rm i 0 s product and paying the price p i is given by
This quadratic utility function has been widely used in oligopoly theory to compare Cournot and Bertrand competition (see, e.g., Singh and Vives (1984) , Bester and Petrakis (1993), Qiu (1997 ), Häckner (2000 ). Products are substitutes (complements) if°i s positive (negative). To ensure that the …rms' problem stays strictly concave we have to assume°> 1=(1 ¡ N). Moreover, Assumption 1 excludes the case°= 0 where goods are fully independent and a takeover has no implications.
15
From the …rst-order condition determining the optimal consumption of good i, we obtain the inverse demand for product i:
On the supply side we assume that …rms can produce at constant marginal costs equal to c, with ® > c¸0.
Cournot Competition
Suppose …rst that …rms compete in quantities. We relegate all derivations to the Appendix. If N independent …rms compete, each realizes the payo¤ ¦ N;C , which is given by
If takeover takes places, which reduces the number of independent …rms to N ¡ 1, the pro…ts of the integrated …rm ¦ N¡1;C M and the pro…ts of each outsider ¦ N¡1;C U are given by
Using (10) and (11) we can calculate the respective pro…t di¤erentials ¼ With linear demand quantities are strategic substitutes in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) if goods are substitutes. In other words, outsiders will optimally increase their supply in reaction to the expected reduction of the integrated …rm's total output. This reduces the insiders' ability to reap the bene…ts from a higher concentration. This accommodation e¤ect is relatively more pronounced the less di¤erentiated the goods are, i.e., the higher°> 0, and the smaller the integrated …rm's share of total output, i.e., the higher the number of …rms N. While insiders strictly lose if goods are complete substitutes, i.e., if°= 1 holds, we …nd a threshold°C > 0 such that also insiders gain if°<°C holds. The range of parameters°> 0 for which insiders gain shrinks as the market share of each individual …rm becomes smaller with an increase in
N.
If goods are complements, the …rms' strategies become strategic complements in the case of Cournot competition with linear demand. As the integrated …rm increases its output to internalize the positive externality on the demand of its own goods, the outside …rms follow suit, creating a positive "feedback" e¤ect for the insiders. To provide an example for the threshold°C, we obtain°C ¼ 0:56 if there are N = 3 …rms in the market. Lemma 1 is of independent interest as it complements previous results on the pro…tability of a merger under Cournot competition with linear demand. To our knowledge, the literature has con…ned itself to noting that a bilateral merger, which does not lead to monopoly, can not be pro…table if goods are complete substitutes.
By Lemma 1 pro…tability can be achieved if goods are su¢ciently di¤erentiated. If we were to take a more standard approach asking whether a bilateral merger is stable, we could therefore conclude from Lemma 1 that this is the case if and only if°·°C holds. Our takeover game, which takes into account also outsiders' pro…ts, obtains less radical predictions. Substituting equilibrium pro…ts into the takeover formula (1), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. In the case of Cournot competition, the takeover probability ½ C is strictly decreasing over°·°C and satis…es ½ C = 0 for all°¸°C . Moreover, ½ C < 1 holds everywhere.
Proof. See Appendix.
As products become less complementary (over°< 0) and more substitutable (over°> 0), the takeover probability ½ C decreases. Moreover, the takeover probability is always strictly smaller than one. This holds even though for values°<°C the pro…ts of the integrated …rm exceed those realized if the takeover fails. It is worthwhile to recall that the underlying "public good" problem in the takeover process stems from two di¤erent sources. First, it can be shown that ¼
, i.e., that outsiders' pro…ts increase more than those of insiders. Second, we can show that B > ¦ N;C , i.e., that the target requires a "bid premium".
Bertrand Competition
Consider next the case of Bertrand competition in prices. We obtain from (8) the individual demand functions
Solving for the unique equilibrium with N independent …rms we obtain the individual pro…ts
while after a takeover insiders and outsiders realize the respective pro…ts
with ª =°2(N 2 ¡ 5N + 5) +°(3N ¡ 7) + 2.
With linear demand the case of Bertrand competition mirrors that of Cournot competition. If goods are substitutes prices are strategic complements, while if goods are complements prices are strategic substitutes. Hence, in contrast to the Cournot case, both insiders and outsiders cannot be worse o¤ after a takeover if goods are substitutes. However, insiders may lose if goods are su¢ciently complementary.
Lemma 2. In the case of Bertrand competition the takeover implies the following changes in pro…ts. Outsiders always gain, i.e., ¼ To provide an example, we obtain°B ¼ ¡0:36 for N = 3. Lemma 2 again complements results in the literature on Bertrand competition, where, to our knowledge, only the case of integration under substitutes has received attention so far.
Substituting equilibrium pro…ts (14) and (15) into the takeover formula (1), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. In the case of Bertrand competition, the takeover probability ½ C is strictly increasing over°¸°B and satis…es ½ B (°C ) = 0 for all°·°B. Moreover,
By Proposition 3 the takeover probability ½ B increases as products become less complementary (over°< 0) and more substitutable (over°> 0).
Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Competition
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 reveals that the case of Bertrand competition mirrors that of Cournot competition. In other words, while the insider's share of total gains decreases in°under Cournot competition, it increases under Bertrand competition.
Intuitively, the respective takeover probabilities ½ Besides appealing to the role of capacity constraints (a view famously formalized by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) ), one often thinks of Cournot and Bertrand competition as di¤erent forms of market conduct; i.e., as di¤erent degrees of toughness of competition in the …nal market.
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From this perspective Bertrand can be considered as the more competitive mode of market interaction because the resulting equilibrium prices are strictly lower than under Cournot competition. Proposition 4 can then be summarized as saying that more competition makes higher concentration more likely if goods are substitutes and less likely if goods are complements.
The last observation rises an interesting issue regarding the welfare comparison of Bertrand and Cournot competition. By reducing the prevailing prices for a given number of …rms, Bertrand competition increases consumer rents and total welfare.
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If goods are substitutes, we know, however, from Proposition 4 that this bene…t of Bertrand competition is mitigated by the higher propensity for takeover under this mode of competition. From this perspective an adequate comparison of welfare under di¤erent modes 1 6 Using L'Hôpital's rule, we obtain for lim°! 0 ½ B (°) and
¡1
. It should be recalled that the case of°= 0 is excluded by Assumption 1, which, however, is without consequences for this argument. 1 7 One well-known formalization of this view can be obtained by a conjectural variation approach. 1 8 This holds for the linear speci…cations in Section 3. For more general results on prices and welfare see, e.g., Singh and Vives (1984) , Vives (1985) , and Okuguchi (1987) . of conduct must take into account the implications on the prevailing concentration of the industry, which is itself an endogenous variable. If a more competitive mode of conduct makes higher concentration more likely, this should typically produce a countervailing e¤ect on total welfare, which may more than outweigh lower prices for a given number of …rms.
If goods are complements, a similar countervailing e¤ect prevails as in the case with substitutes. By Proposition 4 takeover is now less likely under Bertrand competition. As welfare increases with concentration if goods are complements, this counteracts the gains from lower prices under Bertrand competition obtained for a given number of …rms.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a framework to study takeover incentives, which, in contrast to most previous approaches, takes into account both insiders' and outsiders' gains from a higher concentration. We obtain a simple and intuitive prediction for the likelihood of takeover, which is an increasing function of the insiders' share in total industry gains achieved by an increase in concentration.
Our main application to a linear model provides a complete characterization of takeover probabilities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, i.e., for an arbitrary number of …rms, for complements and substitutes, and for di¤erentiated and homogenous goods. Under Cournot competition the insiders' share of total industry gains strictly decreases as goods become less complementary and more substitutable. The opposite holds under Bertrand competition. Predicting a higher probability for takeover under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and a lower probability if goods are complements, we argue that this counteracts any welfare gains under Bertrand competition due to lower prices for a given number of …rms.
To conclude this paper, we return to the casual observations on the steel and semiconductor industry made in the introduction. Both industries are characterized by extreme cyclical movements in capacity utilization, prices, and pro…ts. It may be an interesting empirical question whether consolidating activities in these and other industries are hampered by the addressed public good e¤ect. Our prediction linking takeover and consolidation to the insiders' share of total gains may provide a useful tool in this analysis.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
Derivation of pro…ts
We …rst solve the Cournot equilibrium in more detail. Without a takeover the N independent …rms set quantities to maximize ¦ i = (® ¡ c ¡ q i ¡°P j6 =i q j )q i , which gives i's reaction function
Solving the system of N best-response functions, we obtain a unique equilibrium where the symmetric quantities are given by
Substituting in ¦ i we obtain (9). If the target is taken over by, say, …rm j 2 Inf1g, the integrated …rm's pro…t equals
Solving for the reaction function, we obtain that the two quantities are set equal to
For outsiders k 2 Inf1; jg, we obtain the reaction function
Solving for the unique equilibrium we obtain for the integrated …rm and the outsiders the quantities
which yield the pro…ts (10) and (11).
Proof of the assertions
We are now in the position to prove Lemma 1. For the pro…t di¤erential of outsiders, which is denoted by ¼ C U in the Cournot case, it is immediate that ¼ C U > 0 holds from °2 (1= (1 ¡ N) ; 1)nf0g. Calculating the equilibrium pro…t di¤erential of the combined …rm, we obtain that ¼ C M > 0 holds if and only if
Condition (16) is quadratic in N , which suggests an indirect way to prove the assertion in Lemma 1. Solving the quadratic form we obtain two critical values
We …rst show that the term in rectangular brackets in (17) is monotonic in°. Calculating its derivative reveals that, regardless of the sign of°, the sign of the derivative is determined by the expression ¡°3 +°2 + 2°¡ 12¡ 2 p (°+ 1)(°2 ¡ 2°+ 3), which is strictly negative given°2 [¡1; 1]. By substituting°= ¡1 it follows that N 1 · 2 and N 2 · 2. We show next that the only binding condition is N · N 1 for the case°> 0. Consider …rst the case°< 0 and the condition N · N 2 . Transforming the requirement and using°( N ¡ 1) > ¡1, which holds by assumption, shows that it is surely satis…ed in case 4°2 < 5 +°, which always holds. Note next that for°< 0 the condition N 1 · N follows directly as N¸3 and N 1 · 2. Turning to°> 0 note similarly that N¸N 2 holds from N 2 · 2. It thus remains to consider the condition N · N 1 , where we already know that the threshold N 1 is strictly decreasing in°. Moreover, for°! 0 it holds that N 1 ! 1, while N 1 = 1 + p 2 < 3 holds for°= 1. Combining the values for N 1 at the boundaries with the monotonicity of N 1 in°proves the existence of the threshold 0 <°C < 1 and its monotonicity in N, as asserted in Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote the equilibrium probability with which a given …rm bids the reserve price in the Cournot case by r C (°; N). Note that, in contrast to the proof of Proposition 1, we now make the dependency on both°and N explicit. By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 we obtain r C (°; N) > 0 for all°<°C(N) and r C (°; N) = 0 for all°¸°C(N ), where we have written the threshold°C(N) explicitly as a function of N. Recall from Lemma 1 that 0 <°C(N) < 1 and that°C (N) is strictly decreasing in N. We show that for all N the probability r C (°; N ), and thus ½ C (°; N), is strictly decreasing over °2 (1=(1¡ N);°C(N)]. 19 Substituting the respective pro…t di¤erentials ¼ C M and ¼ C U into (7) and di¤erentiating yields
To show that this holds, we prove …rst that » 1 (°; N) is strictly increasing in N over N¸3. We denote the derivative of » 1 with respect to N by » 2 (°; N) and obtain
Claim. It holds that » 2 (°; N) > 0.
Proof. Suppose …rst°> 0, in which case » 2 > 0 holds if
It is thus su¢cient to show that the right-hand side of (19) is bounded from above by three. Setting the right-hand side of (19) lower than three reduces to ¡°3 + 16°2 ¡ 12°¡ 12 < 0. We show that the left-hand side of this inequality, which we denote by » 3 (°), is strictly negative over the considered support°2 (0; 1). Di¤erentiating » 3 yields » 0 3 (°) = ¡3°2 ¡ 32°+ 12, which is negative over°2 (0; (16¡ 2 p 55)=3) and positive over°2
((16 ¡ 2 p 55)=3; 1], implying that » 3 (°) < 0 is surely satis…ed in case it holds on the boundaries of the considered interval. (Observe that (16 ¡ 2 p 55)=3 ¼ 0:39.) As we obtain » 3 (0) = ¡3 and » 3 (1) = ¡9=4, we have thus shown that » 2 > 0 holds for°> 0.
Suppose next that°< 0, where » 2 > 0 holds if
It is thus su¢cient to show that the right-hand side of (20) is bounded from below by three, which is again the case if » 3 (°) is strictly negative over the considered support°2
[1=(1 ¡ N); 0). (Observe that we use°< 0 and 3 ¡ 2°> 0 when transforming this requirement.) Using that » 0 3 < 0 for all°< 0, » 3 (°) < 0 holds surely over the considered support if it holds at the lower boundary 1=(1 ¡ N) or at some other value°< 1=(1 ¡ N). Given N¸3 it is thus su¢cient to consider°= ¡0:5, where we obtain » 3 (¡0:5) = ¡1. This concludes the proof that » 2 > 0 holds also for°< 0. Q.E.D.
Having shown that » 2 > 0 holds for all feasible values of°, i.e., that » 1 (°; N) is strictly increasing in N, it remains to show for the lower boundary N = 3 that » 1 (°; 3) > 0. We obtain for » 1 (°; 3) the value » 4 (°) = 2°3 ¡ 18°2 + 12°+ 16. We show …rst that Having shown that » 1 (°; N) > 0 holds for all N over the respective domain of°, it follows that dr C =d°< 0, and thus d½
Proof of Lemma 2
Derivation of pro…ts
We …rst solve the Bertrand equilibrium in more detail. Summing over all N inverse demand functions we obtain
Substituting
, this yields the demand functions (12). If no takeover takes place, we obtain the reaction functions
; 0 ¾ and the unique (symmetric) equilibrium prices
which give rise to (13). If i = 1 is taken over by j, we …nd that the integrated …rm chooses symmetric prices given by the reaction function
, while for outsiders the reaction function of some k 2 Inf1; jg equals
Solving for the unique price equilibrium, we obtain
Suppose next N¸4 and note …rst that the factor multiplied by°2 in (23) Together with Á 4 (4) = 27 it then follows that Á 4 (N) > 0 for all N¸4. We can now determine the behavior of Á 2 (°; N) in°for N¸4. As the factor multiplied by°2, i.e., Á 3 (N ), is strictly positive and as we obtained for the left boundary Á 2 (1=(1¡N ); N) < 0, the quadratic form implies that, as°increases, Á 2 is …rst negative and then positive. As a consequence, Á 1 (°; N) …rst decreases and then increases in N. As we already noted that Á 1 (1=(1 ¡ N); N) < 0, this implies that Á 1 (°; N) has indeed a unique zero also for
Proof that°B is increasing in N To complete the proof of Lemma 2, we show that°B(N) is increasing in N . As the threshold was de…ned as the unique zero of Á 1 (°; N) = 0 over°2 [1=(N ¡ 1); 1], we can obtain monotonicity of°B(N ) by implicit di¤erentiation. For this purpose recall …rst from above that Á 1 cuts zero from below as we increase°, i.e., that the derivative satis…es at this point 
To show that Á 5 (°B(N); N) < 0 we proceed indirectly and consider again the problem Á 1 (°; N ) = 0, where we now solve for N given some°. Note that we can restrict consideration to the values°where°=°B(N) is feasible. We show …rst that this restricts the domain of°to values ¡0:4 <°< 0. To see this, recall …rst that we derived 1=(1¡N ) <°B(N ) < 0, which implies the restriction for all N¸4. Moreover, for N = 3 we can show directly that°B(3) > ¡0:4. The latter follows as Á 1 (¡0:4; 3) = ¡0:224, while we have shown that Á 1 (°; 3) is strictly increasing in°and has thus its zero to the right of°= ¡0:4.
Note next that from°> 1=(1 ¡ N) the solution for Á 1 (°; N) = 0 must satisfy N < (°¡ 1)=°. It holds that Á 1 (°; 0) = 4 + 69°2 ¡ 32°¡ 43°3, which is strictly positive for all°· 0, while we obtain at the upper boundary Á 1 (°; (°¡1)=°) = 2°(1¡2°2), which is negative by°2 (¡0:4; 0). We can thus already conclude that for given°we obtain at least one zero denoted by N(°), which satis…es 0 < N(°) < (°¡ 1)=°. Moreover, at this zero it follows from the behavior of Á 1 at the boundaries N = 0 and N = (°¡ 1)=°t hat Á 1 cuts zero from above, i.e., that Á 5 (°; N(°)) = 0. If we can show that there is a unique zero for Á 1 in the feasible domain, it must follow that Á 5 (°B(N); N) < 0. For uniqueness note …rst that Á 5 is a quadratic form in N, where the factor multiplied by N 2 is negative. We obtain Á 5 (°; 0) = ¡70°2 + 16°+ 67°3, which is strictly negative.
At the upper boundary we obtain Á 5 (°; (°¡ 1)=°) =°(16°2 ¡ 3), which has the two zeros ¡ p 3=4 and p 3=4, where ¡ p 3=4 ¼ ¡0:43 is strictly smaller than the previously derived lower boundary ¡0:4 for°. As we have shown above that Á 5 (°; 0) < 0 and as 15°3 < 0, which is the factor multiplied with N 2 in (24), it thus follows that Á 5 (°; N ) is negative for low N and positive for high N. Together with the derived values for Á 1 at the boundaries N = 0 and N = (°¡ 1)=°this implies that Á 1 has indeed a unique zero N(°) at the considered domain. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Denote the equilibrium probability with which a given …rm bids the reserve price in the Bertrand case by r B (°; N) and recall that r B (°; N) > 0 for all°>°B(N) and We have thus shown that (27) holds for all N¸4 and that therefore the zeros of (26) must lie to the left of 1=(1 ¡ N), which completes the proof for Ã 3 (°; N) > 0. Q.E.D.
